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Abstract
Brueckner et alii (1999) have explained urban population through
amenities distribution. Based on their model, this paper introduces a
productive sector and helps to understand employment suburbaniza-
tion in a new way.
Considering amenities valorisation, the “people follow jobs” vs.
“jobs follow people” case is discussed for Central Business District
or high-brawn services …rms. If they favour natural amenities, they
might leave the historical center. A big constraint against that move
is that the …rm wants to keep its employees who all live around the
center. Despite conventional centripetal forces, they can settle in the
suburbs before the households. People may than follow the …rm in
the suburbs.
JEL Classi…cation: R10 - R12 - R14 - R30 - L89
Key Words: Cities, Location Choice, Suburban Areas, Multipolariza-
tion
1 Introduction1;2
In March 1999, the French car manufacturer Peugeot SA decided to build
its design center in Velizy, located in the greater Paris area, approximately
1Adress: Insee Picardie, 1, rue Vincent Auriol 80040 Amiens Cedex. 33.1.44.65.99.13
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115 km south east of Paris. Why choose Velizy ? In the Press kit the corpo-
rate management explains that the chosen location o¤ers the best trade-o¤
between several factors, the most important being ”the direct proximity to
Paris, a center of attraction for artistic creation as well as for industry, and
the accessibility of the site”. The site is indeed in the ’Golden Triangle’ of
the car industry since more and more manufacturers or vendors have moved
close to this location. But corporate communication emphasises that ”while
the Design Center is meant to allow an e¢cient organisation of exchanges,
it is at the same time supposed to ensure the utmost serenity to designers
and engineers, since it is an essential condition for the inventiveness and the
creation sheltered from the murmur of the world”. Hence the site is eventu-
ally located next to a highway connection and an airport, but between the
Meudon forest, the Verrieres forest and the Versailles forest.
The tension underlying the trade-o¤ appears clearly. A high brawn ser-
vices …rm needs to be close to its source (artists, congress, competitors and
vendors) but in a protected and quiet place. The …rm primarily optimises
the employee productivity in a branch where it is highly dependent on the
environment. If we use the typology de…ned by Brueckner et alii (1999),
the …rm chooses between modern amenities whose level depends on the local
economic environment and natural (or historical) amenities that depend on
the surrounding landscape.
The relationship between the location choice of a …rm and the amenities
may even be stronger if this …rm considers its employees utility. If the latter
favour natural amenities, as Brueckner at alii assume it, than a …rm may
chose to relocate a plant to improve the utility of its employees and then to
bene…t from it. In 2002 Peugeot relocated as well part of its headquarters
from central Paris to Poissy, 30km west: one point worth mentionning about
this choice is that the company o¤ered its employees to …nance part of the
housingfor those whowouldfollowthe…rm andbuya residence inthis remote
suburb. One major argument was the new vicinity to natural amenities. In
this particular case the …rmrelocates althoughit does not expect any increase
in productivity; it relocates because it has lower costs in the suburbs and it
can take advantage of the increase in its employees utility.
Those two speci…c examples pinpoint the role of amenities in the location
choices of the …rms, should it be direct or not. Of course they both concern a
single company. But this case is not seldom: in the second section, I will deal
with the overall evolution of the employment location in Greater Paris. The
rise ofSecondary Employment Centers(SEC) but also that ofthe unclustered
2suburban jobs is striking over the last 25 years. If Central Paris is still rich,
it looses more and more jobs and owns a smaller share of highskilled ones.
This result needs a theoretical perspective also provided in that section.
Few model tackle the employment suburbanization in ways that can ex-
plain that …rms decide to relocate in the suburbs even though people still
live in the Center. Section 3 develops a model based on amenities as a gen-
eralisation of Brueckner et alii (1999) integrating one productive sector. As
in the original model there are two populations, one rich and the other poor.
The poor are assumed to work in a sector evenly distributed over the city
while the rich work in the Central Business District (CBD). We focus on the
choices of the …rms located in the CBD in relationhip with the choices of the
rich population, knowing that the latter are interactively determined with
the constraints imposed on the poor. A …rm will integrate as a constraint
that all their employees must remain with them, that is to say the utility of
the employees in the new location must be at least equal to the utility they
enjoyed before the move. We will use a backward resolution - each …rm …rst
assesses the choice of their employees to eventually follow the company or to
remain in the CBD. Considering the anticipated population pattern, the …rm
derives the constraints that bind its choice, namely the necessity to keep its
employees, and then decides to leave or not.
We show that as long as the …rms hardly value the natural amenities we
are in a classical framework - the households leave before the …rms who can
decide to follow them. But as soon as …rms are signi…cantly sensitive to the
centrifugal forces created by the attraction of a green working environment,
then they can be the …rst to leave the center. Households can then be led
to follow the …rms if the change of work location drastically modi…es their
residential trade-o¤s or they can stay in the center if they still have a greater
preference for the center relatively to the poor.
We will study the various possible scenarii in section 4 before concluding
in section 5.
2 The rise of suburban employment
Whatever the logics lying behind it, the case of Peugeot is not seldom. Be-
tween 1975 and 1999, central Paris has lost more than 15% of its jobs, from
3Figure 1: Evolution of the employment in Greater Paris
1,918,060 down to 1,600,815 jobs ( …gure 13). Meanwhile the inner ring has
grown 6.8%, suburbanareas 35.8% andsuburbanemployment clusters 37.7%.
Finally the employment distribution in the greater Paris area has completely
changed, since Paris ’intra-muros’ now represents twice as less as what it
used to in the early 1960’s. The city now weights 27.7% of all the jobs in
the region against 36.3% twenty …ve years ago. Employment today is almost
evenly distributed between the center, the inner ring (26.6%), the suburban
clusters (24.6%) and the suburban areas (21.1%). On the one hand, some
SEC have grown very fast. Most of the ’New Towns’ of the Paris Area and
the new Airport area have experienced very high growth rates, from 100% up
to 650%. Onthe other hand one should notice the importance of unclustered
employment. Although the suburbanisation of jobs does not automatically
translates into the apparition of ’Edge cities’ as described by Garreau (1992)
in the American context, this movement impacts all occidental cities includ-
ing those known to be very monocentric such as Paris.
While households massively moved from the centers of occidental cities
to their remote suburbs, suburbanisation also impacted employment. Since
Mills (1972) a lot of studies have shown this trend of leaving the centers of
the cities, and they all wondered whether “jobs follow people” or “people
follow jobs” (Steinnes (1982)).
The …rst scenario belongs to the classical analysis framework - jobs leave
the center whenthe costs of accessing the city center become too high. When
the city grows, the average distance to the center increases and the trans-
portation costs tend to increase drastically. A suburban location enables to
3Sources : Insee, Recensements. The greater Paris area encompasses the Ile-de-France
region and the …rst ring of clusters around it.
4save on real estate and transportation costs. Following the mere action of
conventional centripetal and centrifugal forces, it can be pro…table for a …rm
to leave the center despite the advantages it entails ( greater chalandise zone,
agglomeration externalities ) and to locate in the residential suburban area.
The second scenario, where a …rm leaves the center to locate in an empty
place where there is no jobs nor households, is less often addressed in lit-
erature. The natural outcome of centripetal and centrifugal forces being
as presented above, it is obvious that one cannot consider a …rm locating
in a totally virgin place without introducing external e¤ects. Fujita (1985)
pinpoints two axes to address that question: competitive models with exter-
nalities and non competitive models with scale e¤ects.
In the latter, suburbanisation relates to imperfect competition mecha-
nisms either on the goods market or on the real estate market. On the one
hand Fujita et alii (1997) studied the case where it can be pro…table for a
…rm to locate in an empty area as long as it has enough in‡uence on the
good market to be assured that its employees and commercial partners will
follow. On the other hand, Hendersen and Mitra (1996), following a long
tradition of papers, built a model about the real estate market. It assumes
the existence of a public or private developer who is able to anticipate the
e¤ect of its decisions on the land use pattern. If he believes he can attract
enough …rms and then enough households, he will build a secondary center
where …rms will locate primarily.
The …rst axis put forward by Fujita (1985) encompasses seven versions.
Two of them relate speci…cally to …rms. He …rst suggests to vary the type
of externalities a¤ecting the di¤erent agents of the economy and then to use
models withseveral economicsectors. As each sector has a di¤erent approach
to urban space, the needs are di¤erent across sectors and location choices are
very likely to be di¤erent as well.
Usually, a functionnal core-periphery organisation is assumed within the
cities. White collar jobs mostly locate around the CBD, whereas blue collar
ones are in the suburbs. Indeed, what Duranton and Puga (2002) notice for
huge economic regions is even more relevant within a metropolitan area. In
1999, Paris stands for 28% of white collar jobs and for 17% of the blue collar
ones. At the same time 11% of the white collars and 31% of the blue ones
are located in the remote suburbs. But the dynamics behind this snapshot
is that the center is becoming less and less dominant; twenty …ve years ago,
Paris accounted for half of the highskilled jobs of the area. Hence the rise
of white collar jobs has been of 45% in Central Paris (130,000 jobs) while it
5Figure 2: Geographical setting of the main types of jobs in Greater Paris
6has reached 150% in the suburbs and in the SEC (230,000 jobs).
As it appears in Table 2, Central Paris has also lost a huge amount of
pink and blue collar jobs. This has partly been studied by Ota and Fujita
(1993). In this paper we focus on the speci…c needs of top services …rms or
high brawn …rms and try to explain why more and more choose not to locate
in the Center.
3 The model
Highbrawn services or high technology …rms do not belong to those …rms
whose competitiveness mostly depends on their ability to produce at least
costs. Of course production costs are part of the decision making but the
survival of the …rm even depends on its capacity to innovate. When choosing
its location, the …rm takes this constraint into account by using productivity
based criteria rather than more conventional ones. With the Peugeot-Velizy
case, the issue of the commuting costs for employees, which is a traditional
centripetal force in urban economics, was not addressed - the location choice
was purely industrial. From the strict point of view of the economic mod-
elling that underlies this location choice, we face here a partial equilibrium
framework.
It is nevertheless possible to get a general equilibrium framework that
integrates households using a di¤erent method. As the Peugot-Poissy case
shows it, the …rmislinked toits employees - they havebeen trainedinternally,
they are integrated in working teams and often they detain informations
that are strategic for the …rm competitiveness. Employees can be seen as
endowed with ahumancapital the …rm cannot a¤ordto waste. Still in the car
industry, Renault, another major actor in the sector, made the same decision
as Peugeot to move its technical center to the suburbs of Paris. Asked about
the constraints that had prevailed in their location decision, the head of the
corporate transportation policy declared that ”the high priority goal when
creating the Technocentre was not to lose any employee, unless the value
of the company would have dropped”. Without any market power, a single
…rm can not forecast if its competitors will relocate or if they will remain in
the Center. Thus leaving the Center while its employees and its competitors
still locate in here increases the loss of employees probability. So, the …rm
is led to integrate into its decision not only the transportation costs but also
elements of lifestyle and anything that takes part in the employees utility. It
7can range from the size of the housing they can a¤ord at a given distance
from their work location (as in the classical Alonso-Mills-Muth case) to the
whole list of amenities valued by households (as in the framework de…ned by
Brueckner et alii, (1999)).
3.1 The population pattern
The city in which the model is built is linear and is granted exogenous ameni-
ties, both natural and historical that are unevenly distributed in the space.
We keep the de…nition by Brueckner et alii (1999) that “historical amenities
are created by monuments, buildings, parcs and other inherited infrastruc-
tures that are valued by the current inhabitants of the city” whereas natural
amenities are created by the site and the non urban environment it o¤ers4.
By convention, we will consider that natural amenities are increasing with
the distance from the center (a0
n(x) > 0) and historical amenities are de-
creasing (a0
h(x) < 0 ), their sum being so that overall amenities are higher
in the center than in the suburbs (a0 (x) < 0).
Brueckner et alii(1999) use that typology to show to what extent the re-
lationship between the population pattern and the incomes depend on some
idiosyncratic characteristics of a city. That way they demonstrate that if the
marginal value of amenities increases faster with income than the consump-
tion of housing, then a high enough level of amenities can by itself determine
the equilibrium between living in the center or in the suburbs. Whereas in
the classical model (Alonso- Mills- Muth) the rich prefer the suburbs more
than the poor do, the introduction of central amenities that the rich value
more than the poor do leads to reverse the population pattern of the city.
As an illustration they justify by the wealth of the historical landmarks the
fact that Central Paris is rich whereas down-town Detroit is poor as are the
typical suburban American cities.
Ex-ante the city we consider has a segregated population of rich and poor
distributed around the center. To each type of agent corresponds a type of
jobs that are spread a certain way in the city. Under some assumptions (see
below) the size of the city does not depend on the population pattern.
The rich work in the CBD. We assume the location of the blue collar jobs
unchanged, namely in the center of the city. We de…ne t0 as a rate for the
4Obvisouly, at least in Europe, no natural amenity is to be found in its primary form
but all bear more or less a human mark. They are green amenities rather than natural.
8transportation costs that is linear with the distance d from the residence to
the city center 5. Hence, the poor have the same budget constraint as in the
model of Brueckner et alii (1999). The cost of their consumption of goods
e, the price of which is normalized to 1, and of housing pq, cannot be higher
than their income y taken net of transportation costs t0x :
e +pq = y ¡t0x:
Their utility depends on the consumption of e and q and on the amenities a.
To meet a benchmark level u¤, their utility u(e;q;a)must verify
u
¤ = max
q u(y¡ t0x ¡ pq;q;a). (1)
The utility of the richhas thesame form as in thepaper mentioned above.
Their transportation costs are a linear function of their commuting distance
with coe¢cient t1. We just have to replace t0 with t1 in the above equation
and modify the functional form of u(:) to obtain the condition met by the
utility of the rich. If the CBD is in the center (case C), the situation is
the one described by the authors, otherwise (case S) the centripetal force
of professional travels become an additional centrifugal force. We thus can
rephrase the results obtained by the authors while di¤erentiating the two
cases.
Case Ccorresponds exactly to the framework de…ned by Brueckner et alii
(1999). The solution is obtained using the same method. If b x is the border
between the residential area of the rich and that of the poor, the bid rents
o¤ered by both populations at that point must be equal and p0(b x) = p1(b x).
The population left of the border will be the one who o¤ers the highest bid
rent; so the population pattern will depend on the di¤erentials of the bid
rent the two populations at b x. Using equation 1, the di¤erential of the bid
rent for the rich when the CBD is in the center is as follows
p0C









5More precisely, we assume that the transportation cost pattern is unchanged, which is
more consistent with what is observed: if blue collars tend to live closer to their work loca-
tion than the white collars do (Glaeser et Kahn (2000)), the marginal transportation cost
increase with distance to CBD. For instance in the Greater Paris Area, employers pay for
a part of the transportation expenses of their employees and the marginal transportation


















In the above equation the ratio ua
ue is written @v
@a where v is the indirect
utility function. va gives the marginal value of amenities after the optimal
adjustment of housing consumption. In the standard model va = 0. It must
be pointed that the optimal housing consumption depends on the budget
constraint of households. As a consequence it is sensitive to the location of
the CBD in the center or in the suburbs and qC
1 6= qS
1. Obviously, the results
of Brueckner et alii (1999) on the shape of the bid rents are veri…ed, that
is to say when a0 < 0 the traditional e¤ect is strenghened. When a0 > 0
discussions are possible and the e¤ect of conventional forces can be overcome
if a0 is positive and high enough. We can now compare the di¤erential rents.
We assume y0 < y1, t0 < t1 and p0 6= pC




















va[y0¡t0b x;p0(b x);a(b x)]
q0(b x) assumed by the authors to be
positive provided a few assumptions that we can keep without hurting the
model.
Comparing a benchmark situation to a city having amenities spread more
evenly, the authors show that two solutions are possible. Either the tradi-
tional result remains i.e the rich are in the suburbs (provided that t0
q0 > t1
q1),
either the result is new i.e the amenities in the center are so that the rich
live in the center since they value the amenities relatively to the the housing
surface more than the poor.










1 = y1 ¡ t1xS. With the same


















When the CBD is in the suburbs, transportation costs, a crucial con-
ventional force, become centrifugal. Under those conditions, the only cen-











1 (x) < 0 , u(a)
0 < ¡u
et1.
The marginal change in utility arisen from the amenities must be lower than
the drop in utility implied by the increase of transportation costs. Written
as a function of a0(x), that constraint means that the level of amenities must
decrease faster than the transportation costs relatively to the marginal value




It is the case if the amenities are very unevenly spread (strong slope) or
if they are highly valued (high va and low ratio).
The utility of the poor remaining unchanged, the comparison of the dif-
ferential rents at b x is following
¢ ´ p
0S











The rich will be in the center (¢ < 0) only if the amenities are very unevenly
spread (a0 negative and high absolute value), that is, if the historical ameni-
ties are by far superior to the natural amenities so that amenities overall
decrease with the distance from the center. For all other values of a0 the rich
will be in the suburbs.
The initial con…guration corresponds to case C since the CBD is in the
center. When dealing with the relocation of a …rm, case S will be used to
assess the impact of the change on the population pattern in the city and to
assess whether the relocation will actually occur or not. Indeed the decisions
of the …rm partially depend on how the households are supposed to react
after their employer has moved to the suburbs.
3.2 The choice of the …rm
Here we consider only the high brawn services or high technology …rms. All
the other jobs, those that are not speci…c to the CBD, are evenly distributed
in the space and not mobile. The CBD is composed of …rms that produce
exportable goods using merely their L employees. There is no di¤erential
exportation costs within the city and the consumption of equipment and real
estate is supposed neglectible for our purpose. Production thus just depends
on work, whose e¢ciency is impacted by the distance to other similar …rms
11(agglomeration externalities caprtured by gd) and by the working environ-
ment ga.
f (a;d;L) = (ga (x) + gd(x))L:
Note that if we assume that ga and gd are linear and ga(x) = ¯ and gd(x) =
®jx¡ xj, x being where the CBD is located, we stand in the linear case
decribed by Fujita and Thisse (1997) when all …rms are concentrated in one
point, here x (x 2 f0;xSg). In that case, g0
a = 0 and the classical results of
Fujita and Ogawa (1980) and Imai (1982) stand that only one equilibrium
exists and it is either monocentric, mixed or not completely mixed. Introduc-
ing amenities prevents mixed equilibriums from occurring as soon as …rms
and households do not value these amenities the same way.
Every …rm then looks for the location that maximizes its pro…t
¼(x) = r(ga(x) +gd(x))L¡ (y1¡ tx)L,
under the constraint that no employee leaves the …rm. To express that con-
straint implies a set of assumptions on the …rms behaviour that impact the
decision making process and its outcome. First we assume that all the …rms
are identical. As a consequence a …rm knows that if it is pro…table to leave
the center on an individual basis, it will be the case for all the other …rms.
But they cannot coordinate their decisions since they are in an imperfect
information context. Two cases can occur :
Case 1 : It is not pro…table for the …rm to move. Nobody …nds incentives
to move so the CBD stays where it is.
Case 2 : It is pro…table for a particular …rm to relocate even though the
CBD does not move. The …rm moves and so do the CBD.
In all the cases, a …rm taken individually is able to anticipate the future
location of the CBD. Thus it is able to compute the utility of its employees
in the future con…guration. Keeping its employees comes downto u(x;xS) ¸
u(x;x).
Given the fact that a …rm leaves, the reaction of the households will
be considered in the framework S described in the previous section. The
di¤erential rent o¤ered by the rich will be p0S
1. Since a change in the con-
ditions of the rich does not impact the condition of the poor, we know that
pS
1 (b x) = p0(b x) = pC
1 (b x) and qS
1 (b x) = qC
1 (b x). We can then write p0S















q1(b x) > 0, p0S
1 (b x) > p0C
1 (b x):
In addition, since the rich are in the center, we knowthat p0
0(b x) > p0C
1 (b x).
Therefore the question is whether p0
0(b x) > p0S
1 (b x) > p0C
1 (b x) or p0S
1 (b x) >
p0
0(b x) > p0C
1 (b x). In the former case, the rich stay in the center although the
jobs have moved to the suburbs. In the latter they choose to move if the
CBD moves to the suburb. In all cases
¢C ´ p
0C
1 (b x) ¡ p
0
0(b x) < p
0S
1 (b x)¡ p
0
0(b x) ´ ¢S,
and the rich stay in the center if ¢S < 0.
The move of the CBD weakens the power of attraction of the center by
reversing the direction of the traditional force - transportation costs. The
amenities must be particularly high in the center (a0 negative with a high
absolute value) to have the households stay in the center when the …rms
have decided to leave. The constraint upon the …rms therefore depends on
the distribution of the amenities.
If a0 is negative and very high in absolute value, …rms anticipate that the
employees will stay in the center even though the …rm leaves to xS. The
…rms must take it into account and pay the employees y ¡ t1(b x ¡x ¡ xS)
and no longer y¡ t1x.
The pro…ts aresupposedmonotonous withrespect tox (whichentails that
ga et gd are linear) hence the …rms are led to consider corner solutions at 0
and at xS which corresponds to the city edge. As conditions of competition
remain unchanged, y1 does not change and …rms will relocate if and only if
¼(0) = f (a(0);d(0);L) ¡(y1 ¡ t1x)L (4)
· f (a(xS);d(xS);L) ¡ (y1¡ t1(b x¡ x ¡ xS))L = ¼(xS).
If we assume that q is constant on [0; b x] and that employees of a given …rm
are mixed in the population; then they will be evenly distributed on this
interval. One can then state x ´ b x
2. Using this equivalence in equation 4 and
simplifying by L; we can write the above condition as following:
¼(0) ¸ ¼(xS) , ga(xS) ¸ ga (0)¡ gd(xS)+ t1xS:
13Since gd < 0andsince we supposed ga monotonous, theabove conditionis
in contradiction with the original condition that a0 is highly negative for the
households. In order for the …rms to decide to leave, knowing the employees
will stay in the center, the way they value the amenities must be di¤erent
from the way households value them. If the …rms value poorly the historical
amenities but value highly the natural amenities, the scenario becomes pos-
sible. The sensitivity of the …rms productivity to amenities can theoretically
be applied for natural as well as historical amenities. It seems though that if
…rms value historical amenities for extraordinary events (congress, salons),
they do not pursue them on a daily basis whereas it can be the case for nat-
ural amenities6. Therefore it is realistic to make the assumption that …rms
do not value historical amenities and that ga(x) = an(x). Under that condi-
tion, the case just above is possible if natural amenities are unevenly spread
(a0
n high and positive). This result is symmetric to the one of Brueckner et
alii (1999) where the condition for reversing the population pattern is that
the historical amenities are highly valued by households and that a0 is high
in the negative values.
Proposition 1 If the households valuation for amenities is strongly decreas-
ing from the center, then no …rm will leave the center but those which favour
productive exogenous amenities.
If a0 is not strongly negative or even positive, yet low enough to keep the
rich households in the center, then the …rms can expect that their employees
will follow them if they move to the suburbs. Since the …rms cannot coor-
dinate their decisions, they assume the CBD won’t move. It is only when it
is pro…table for every single …rm to move individually while the others are
assumed stable, that all …rms will leave and the CBD will relocate. Never-
theless the …rms anticipate that their employees are ready to follow them.
Everythingelse beingequal, theemployees arereadyto paypS
1 (x) (8x > b x)
and eventually pay p0(x) < pS
1 (x). The …rms capture that rent and add it






Also, the employees enjoy di¤erent amenities once they relocate. The
…rms make up for the loss that corresponds to the di¤erence between the
average dispositions to pay on [0; b x] and on [b x;xS], that is
6The only activites for wich the historical environment can prevail are those of head of-
…ces. We can notice that they are almost the only ones to remain in majority concentrated
























As we set a0 as negative, ±v is negative as well.
The services …rms will chose to relocate to the suburbs if
¼(0) ´ ga(0) ¡ y1 + t1
b x
2
· ga(xS) + gd(xS) ¡
µ
y1 ¡ t1
xs ¡ b x
2
¡ ±p + ±v
¶
´ ¼(xS).
The commuting costs of the …rm is t1
xS¡b x
2 and will be greater or smaller
than t1
b x
2 depending on whether the total surface occupied by the poor will
be greater or smaller than the one occupied by the rich. The size of the poor
population can be normalized so that the surface they occupy is equivalent
to the one occupied by the rich. The condition for the …rms to leave can be
written as follows
ga(xS) ¡ ga (0) ¸ ¡gd(xS) ¡ ±p + ±v:
We verify that the agglomeration externalities are a hurdle to the suburban-
isation of jobs since if gd = 0 the condition is smoother.
So the existence of amenities for the households modi…es the traditional
equilibriums even in the absence of amenities for the …rms. If the di¤erence
of the compensations linked to the di¤erent opportunity costs ±p and ±v
overcomethee¤ect ofagglomerationexternalities, thesecondtermis negative
and the condition is veri…ed including for ga constant.
At the core of this mechanism are the opportunity costs. We can easily
verify it using equation (2) et (3) and keeping the assumption that xS = 2b x.
















If the amenities are unevenly spread from the center, it translates in a0 nega-
tive and increasing and ±v positive. The compensation that makes up for the
degradationof thehouseholds lifestyle is all the higher sincethe amenities de-
crease rapidly with the distance from the center. From the households point
15of view, these are the expected mechanisms that lead the rich to concentrate
in the center only if the amenities are high and unevenly distributed.
Despite their similarities, the conditions for the …rms can be considered
as less restrictive than the ones for the households. Indeed a …rm that antic-
ipates higher pro…ts in the future con…guration can move to the suburbs in
order to provoque the new con…guration although the households have not
moved yet. To demonstrate it just turn back to the consequences of the mere
introduction a productive sector on the residential equilibrium. We then
consider the case when …rms are indi¤erent to amenities i.e ga = 0. In the
absence of amenities and in order for the …rms to move to the suburbs; we
need the second term of the inequality to be negative. The sign of ¡±p + ±v







q0 assumed positive follow-
ing Brueckner et alii (1999) and on va [p1] ¡ va[p0] which is negative. If the
consumption of land by households is high enough relatively to the marginal
indirect utility of amenities, then it is possible to obtain ¡±p + ±v < 0. The
lower the agglomeration externalities, the more easily this case will occur.
It corresponds to the scenario where rich households live in the center and
move to the suburbs because the …rms have moved there.
Here we have reached an important point: the mere introduction of a
strategic productive sector can lead households who live in the center to
”follow the jobs”. Firms that anticipate the relocation of the households can
decide to relocate and take advantage of opportunity costs that are likely to
increase to their own bene…t.
What we show here is that even though rich households are located in the
center due to important historical amenities, …rms can nevertheless decide to
move to the suburbs. The initial condition is all the easier to achieve since ga
increases sharply. It is the case if …rms and households value the exogenous
amenities di¤erently and if the former especially value natural amenities.
Firms will be more and more encouraged to leave to the suburbs since the
natural amenities grow.
Proposition 2 If …rms value amenities so that g0
a > 0 or if the agglomera-
tion externalities are balanced by high enough opportunity costs, then subur-
banisation can involve …rst the jobs then the people.
164 Con…gurations
There are two steps in the resolution of the model. In a …rst phase the
households choose where to locate considering that the CBD is in the center.
At that stage we are in the case described by Brueckner et alii (1999). In a
second step, …rms consider a relocation to the suburbs andanticipate howthe
householdswill react to the potential suburbansiation oftheir jobs. The …rms
decision is a backwardresolutiongame: since each…rm has to keep its human
capital unchanged, we …rst settle the choices of the households according to
the relocation plans of the …rms and then …gure out the decisions of a …rm
given those anticipations.
In that regard, eight outcomes are possible :
(1) the rich are in the suburbs and the …rms stay in the center without
impacting the households choices.
(2) the rich are in the suburbs and the …rms stay in the center; which
leads the rich to move to the center
(3) the rich are in the suburbs and the …rms move from the center to the
suburbs and the rich stay in the suburbs
(4) the rich are in the suburbs and the …rms move from the center to the
suburbs; which leads the rich to move back to the center.
(5) the rich are in the center and the …rms stay in the center and the rich
stay in the center.
(6) the rich are in the center and the …rms as well but the rich …nally
decide to move to the suburbs.
(7) the rich are in the center and the …rms move from the center to the
suburbs but the rich stay in the center.
(8) the rich are in the center and the …rms move from the center to the
suburbs; the rich follow them to the suburbs.
Case 1 is the traditional American CBD model. Households value ameni-
ties but the advantage of the center is poor (a0 slightly negative or even
positive). The …rms are kept in the center due to the modern amenities.
Case 3 is the model described in the literature illustrating that ”jobs fol-
low people” which a¤ects all the western cities. It occurs when households
value amenities in such a way that the rich move to the suburbs. The sub-
urbanisation of employees enables the suburbanisation of jobs. In that case,
the modern amenities that keep a …rm in the center, although the employees
would be more productive in the suburbs, is cancelled out by the change in
the transportation costs. Usually a centripetal force, transportation costs
17are here a major centrifugal force. So, even in the absence of amenities for
the …rms, the move from the CBD is possible.All the …rms being the same,
the CBD then leaves the center for the suburbs.
Case 5 is the historical model for Paris. It is characterised by strong
central amenities valued by households, reinforced for the …rms by a massive
lock-in phenomenon incurred by modern amenities.
Case 7 is the atypical Silicon Valley model with a technopole around a
historical city. Central amenities are strong enough to keep households in the
center even after the …rms leave the CBD. The …rms are more sensitive to
natural amenities than to modern amenities so they decide to leave despite
the negative opportunity costs and the potential lock-in phenomenon. Note
that in the long run, this case is not necessarily stable: the only reason that
makes the …rm ready to pay for the commuting costs of remote employees is
the link between a single employee and the human capital it represents. It
thus could be interesting to consider the in‡uence of the rate of turn-over on
the pertinence of the case.
Case 8 is the model according to which ”people follow jobs”. Firms
proceed similarly as in case 7 but it results here in having the households
follow the jobs to the suburbs. Employees do not value the center enough
to resist the opportunity to leave for the suburbs and stop being penalized
by lower net salaries. The move is anticipated by the …rms and makes it
all the more likely for the them to relocate to the suburbs. Most of the
metropolitan area face such dynamics. It partly corresponds to the case
described inintroduction.
Let us note that case 4 occurs only if the CBD consumes a lot of space or
produces negative amenities (pollution, congestion,...) so that its relocation
leads to the eviction of the households from the suburbs. The scenario is
quite unrealistic for services …rms. Finally case 2 and 6 are absurd.
5 Conclusion
The model presented here highlights howthe pursuit of a certain lifestyle and
working environment can impact the urban equlibriums (poulation pattern
and CBD location). Its origniality resides in the introduction of a productive
sector in addition to the households. It takes for granted the results of
Brueckner et alii (1999) and speci…es the conditions under which a strategic
location choice for …rms including amenities valuation of both …rms and
18households changes the traditional equilibriums.
This general approach allows us to list the potential dynamics and the
population patterns they lead to. Among others, we consider the ”people
follow jobs” versus ”jobs follow people” alternative and consider as possible
to have …rms choose suburbanisation before the households either because
they favour natural amenities or because the opportunity costs related to the
anticipated relocation of households are enough by themselves to have the
…rms relocate.
More than the multipolarisation of cities the model helps understand the
spreading of jobs. Indeed the …rms are unable to coordinate their actions.
They can never provoque a move of the CBD, nor anticipate a shift in the
modern amenities distribution: that would be characteristic of a suburban
cluster model rather than of a suburban spread model. Therefore the model
explains why some …rms chose to leave the otherwise highly valued central
cities (inner Paris, Manhattan) in spite of their level of historical amenitiies
is high and despite they are favoured by high agglomeration externalities.
This paperisobviously not anattemptat explaininghowthegreaterParis
area transitioned from a centralized jobs model to a suburbanized employ-
ment model. Of course the relocation of big industrial …rms or the building
of massive infrastructures (Newtowns, airports) have favoured the spreading
and the reorganisation of employment around Paris. But what lies behind
the recent relocation of otherwise traditionally central services …rms is not
captured by those models since the …rms do not always locate close to the
big clusters. Employment outside the economic clusters has incrased by 35%
over the last thirty years and today it represents more than 20% of all jobs
in the greater Paris area.
The model presented here aimed at only a part of the demonstration.
The link between these results and the models where a planner organises the
development should be considered. It would enable to combine dynamics
leading to a spread out suburbanisation and those leading to moultipolar
cities. Such a model could for instance integrate the e¤ect of the suburban
densi…cation of a developed area on the level amenities it conveys. When all
agents make the same choice, the households and the …rms who have left the
center to enjoy a more pleasant environment often …nd themselves stuck in
a degraded environment that no longer meets their expectations.
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